Questions for week 5 readings:
ON FOSS, “FRAMING THE STUDY OF VISUAL RHETORIC: TOWARD A TRANSOFRMATION OF RHETORICAL THEORY.”
On Page 308 Foss discusses visual rhetoric and states that, “function is not synonymous with purpose, which involves an effect that is intended or desired by the creator of the image or object” (Foss 308). Foss then goes on later to say that scholars don’t see the intentions of the creator as determining a correct or incorrect interpretation of a work. Foss argues that when a visual artifact is created it stands by itself independent of the creator’s intention. She claims that this is why function is not synonymous with purpose. I’m not sure I understand this part of her argument?
From my understanding, the argument is that a creator may create visual rhetoric with one intention in mind but once the artifact is created it can be interpreted differently by each individual. This is because each individual applies some kind of psychological connection to the object based on life experience and each person’s life experience is different. However, take Hitler and the example of the visual rhetoric involved in the creation of the swastika. Hitler created the swastika as a sign of power and to represent the values, beliefs and dominance he represented during the reign of the Nazi’s. It can be firmly argued that he created the sign of the swastika in this manner.
I would argue that every person in Europe that viewed the Swastika (after Hitler’s creation of it) understood the meaning of the symbol in the same context as the creator (in this case Hitler). My question is: how does the explanation Foss offer apply to an example such as this one? Can an artist (although I wouldn’t call Hitler an artist by any means) create visual rhetoric with an intention that is universally understood by other people? Is it always the case that function is not synonymous with purpose? Would you consider the symbol of the swastika to be iconic as defined by Foss on Page 308?
HAUSER CH 11-
In this chapter Hauser discusses the idea of identification in rhetoric and argues that “the principle of identification creates an ongoing cycle of joining and dividing, creating the need for a new effort to join that will also divide us from something else” (Hauser 214). From my understanding this means that when we adopt an identification that means something we are dividing it from the opposite of what we adopt as the identification. For example if we come to adopt a picture of our house to represent OUR HOUSE, we are at the same time dividing the picture because we know other pictures of houses are not the same picture as OUR HOUSE. This indirectly implies that identification is identification WITH something else. This is why Hauser argues that identification can occur through any symbolic means.
My question is: can non-verbal communication be used and understood on a universal level to create symbolic interactions other than “…wearing similar clothing, exhibiting common tastes, espousing the same cause, buying into the same ideology and playing by its rules” (Hauser 214). I don’t feel this is discussed to the extent of importance it implies. Hauser emphasizes a lot of language interactions as symbolic but what about the non-verbal communication that comes with language. After all most of communication is non-verbal. Can you develop a symbolic interaction with another person using only non-verbal interactions with no language at all? If so, how is this still possible and how do you think Hauser would respond to your answer?
HAUSER CHAPTER 14-
Hauser touches on Aristotle and his form of syllogistic theory as a way to evaluate an argument as having a valid or invalid conclusion. Basically, Aristotle believed that the value of an argument could be tested, “by examining the relationships among its premises” (Hauser 264). In understanding Aristotle, Hauser states, “Depending on the type of premises and how they are related, we either can or cannot deduce a conclusion” (Hauser 264). Premises are considered to be parts of arguments that have been previously stated or assumed as the basis for further argument. Several examples are given with conclusions that are valid and invalid.
What I found interesting was Aristotle’s understanding of how a rhetor (speaker or person trying to persuade an audience) can use premises that appeal to their audience’s psychological beliefs when conducting an argument. Aristotle defines these premises as “enthymemes” when used in a way to psychologically persuade an audience (Hauser 265). Aristotle realized that using enthymemes was a very powerful way of persuading an audience but still argued that the same system of syllogistic theory could be used to deduce whether a conclusion was considered to be valid or invalid. The reason why this is interesting is because; an audience can be psychologically persuaded using inner beliefs to understand a constructed argument in the manner the rhetor wishes to construct the argument.
What I don’t understand is how the conclusion of an argument can be valid or invalid using Aristotle’s Syllogism theory. If validity comes down to using enthymemes to persuade an audience then doesn’t that mean the validity of an argument’s conclusion can be different depending on audience? If you use the same enthymemes on a different audience that don’t have the same psychological beliefs then that audience might not be persuaded to see your argument as valid. If validity comes down to audience, how can Aristotle’s syllogistic theory ACTUALLY determine if an argument is valid or invalid? How is it possible to EVER know the validity of an argument’s conclusion if validity is capable of changing in the presence of one audience over another? Can you clarify why or why not this is true or not true and offer an explanation to support your argument?
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